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ABSTRACT

The author develops a theoretical framework to examine alternative explanations of an aspect of ethnic relations. He considers Negro equality in terms of the social and political structure which makes black/white hostility possible, judging that this structure might indicate an area for change rather than simply defining a state of being. The key factor in this framework is the feeling of social, political competence of an individual or a group as influenced by considerations of personal status. The consequence of loss or lack of status among a large group might be a political, social movement such as White backlash. Using a general theory of the cognitive basis of attitudes, the author derives a statement about White attitudes toward Black equality that takes into account both society-influenced status rivalry attitudes and personal social distance attitudes. By illustrating the theoretical thought processes necessary for determining the methodology, he emphasizes the importance of the values and attitudes that the investigator brings to his topic. (JH)

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A Theory of Racial Attitudes

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The major task reported here is the development of a theoretical framework to examine alternative explanations of an aspect of ethnic relations. If one were to operate with no further constraints, however, he could not even begin. Even the addition of stipulations of the subject matter, such as what ethnic group or groups, what historical period, and what geographical areas are involved in the analysis, tells us little about what is to be explained. Take, for example, current relations between Negro and Caucasian American citizens. The number of kinds of relations to be explained and types of explanation of each kind of relation is still unmanageable. How should one select?

One strategy for narrowing options is to look at the kinds of selections others are making. (Although this is, in many ways, an unfortunate strategy.) In a recent review of research on ethnic relations, Harding et al. (1969) identified three basic approaches.

> The first may be called the "ethnic group" approach. Here the focus is on a single racial, religious, linguistic, or nationality group, usually one that is a clearly identifiable minority in some modern national state. . . . The second major point of view may be called the "social interaction" approach. Here the focus is not on a single ethnic group but on the interrelationships of two or more such groups, frequently on the relationships of all major ethnic groups in a particular geographic area. . . . The third major point of view is more recent; Rose calls it the "social problems" approach. Here the focus is on "the behavior of discrimination, the attitude of prejudice, and the consequences for the minority and majority groups of both of these" (Rose, 1964, p. 571).

With reference to Harding et al. note that, among the three, the "social problems" approach is the most controversial. They state, "What makes this approach controversial is the fact that the values of the social scientist are inextricably involved in the key concepts of his analysis: 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' are pejorative terms in a way that 'competition' and 'conflict' are not." This statement is, at the same time, both perceptive and obtuse. On the one hand, the concepts "prejudice" and "discrimination" are often meant to convey distaste; but, on the other hand, there are also contexts within which the concepts "competition" and "conflict" convey feelings or attitudes.

Values are implicit in the social problems approach in a more important sense. As one writer has put it, "To term something a social problem is . . . to enact a reclassification of some part or aspect of the common life in order to alter the response it will receive, or the relation it will stand to other parts of the common life" (Seeley, 1967, p. 145). Values of social scientists are involved in the social problems approach not only because certain concepts are employed but also because a particular area and level of analysis have been selected from an almost infinite number of possibilities for scrutiny. Thus, the values of the social scientist are involved in any approach involving substantive questions. Competition and conflict were not cited as involving the values of the investigator in the passage above because its authors seem to regard competition and conflict as unproblematic. To identify something as <u>not</u> a social problem is to promote a set of priorities just as we do when something <u>is</u> identified as a social problem.

Implicit in both the positive and negative ascriptions of aspects of human relationships as social problems are images of societies. Because men can organize into collectivities in a multitude of ways, any attempt to evaluate an aspect of the collective life must be predicted on a normative model of what that collective life should resemble.

Even once we evaluate priorities to a point where we determine that a particular aspect of society is worthy of scrutiny, we must move on in the evaluation process, because the number of choices is still unmanageable. Let us assume that we have decided that the attitudes of one ethnic group toward another are worth investigating. This choice, we hope, is the result of a careful inspection of a model of the kind of collective life to which such an inquiry is responsive. The next step involves the selection of categories or concepts that will focus the inquiry toward a particular aspect of the attitudes of one ethnic group toward another. Here, again, the possibilities are almost limitless, even if we use as a major criterion, the norms of science. There are doubtless a vast number of aspects of ethnic attitudes which we could explain "well." Even if we narrowed our interests (as we shall) to the attitudes of white Americans toward black Americans on a positive-negative continuum, there would be many empirical explanations among which we could not select on scientific grounds alone. We must rely once again on our values. The question which we should ask if we are to be self-conscious about the implications of our grounds for beginning a scientific inquiry into white attitudes toward blacks is: What would we like to do with the results of such an inquiry?

This question might strike some as heretical. The answers to scientific inquiries are, after all, supposed to be true or false regardless of the goals toward which the inquiries are addressed. Even if we agree to this epistemological commitment, however, the above statement about goals still stands. We can look at the implications of this point of view by considering what has been identified as a problem in another area and then looking at two alternative choices of empirical explanations.

Teachers in primary school classrooms frequently find that their attempts at communicating with groups of children are frustrated by the students' differing attention spans. They have found (much to their delight in many instances) that the attention span of a child is markedly influenced by his body chemistry, and drugs prescribed by physicians frequently "calm down" what are referred to as "hyperactive" children so that they no longer create classroom disturbances by leaving their chairs and moving around while the teacher attempts to instruct them. On scientific grounds, the empirical explanation employed (in this case a bio-chemical one) is valid. There is good evidence that the child's activity is related to his body chemistry. The use of such an explanation, however, takes as given that children should learn while sitting together in groups according to a schedule chosen by the school or the teacher.

The hyperactive child concept is an arbitrary one in that the criterion for calling a child hyperactive is social, not biological. A chemical-biological explanation is often used for a "deviant behavior problem" because the educational value premise suggested above is accepted.

From an alternative frame of reference, one could regard the teacher's problem as the strategic one. One could take as given that children have differing interests and attention spans and ask how one might educate large numbers of them nevertheless. If the question is posed this way, the kinds of empirical explanations sought would probably not be chemical-biological. One relevant explanation, for example, would be oriented toward understanding why teachers feel that all the children in the classroom should have the same daily learning schedule. The concepts in such an explanation would probably be something like past training, current role expectations, etc. Once again the validity of the explanation would be determined upon scientific grounds, but the choice of the type of explanation and the concepts contained in it would be derived from the value premises that precipitated the inquiry.

Returning now to the area of white racial attitudes, we are faced with question of what we want to explain and why. If, for example, we confine ourselves to looking at the relationships between personality variables and prejudice toward blacks, we can probably find some that form the basis of an explanation. Prejudice, at least as an attitudinal phenomenon, is correlated with a variety of personality variables, most highly and consistently with authoritarianism (Blalock, 1967, pp. 3-10). What can one do with a personality type of explanation of prejudice? At a minimum, one could recommend it as a test for those to administer to persons they wish to screen for positions if they wish to avoid hiring bigots. Ironically this use of an explanation in the form of weak tendency statements is, itself, another form of bigotry.

The kind of explanation I would like to construct concerning the racial attitudes of white Americans is one that would give us an understanding of the way in which our social and political structure provides a context for inter-ethnic hostility. The particular type of attitude that will concern me is the attitude toward Negro equality. We can conceive of this attitude as a composite of predispositions toward various kinds of racial integration, e.g., housing, jobs, schools, etc., and can distinguish it from attitudes that express preferences for varying degrees of social distance from Negroes. The former is an attitude toward how public policy should be oriented toward Negroes, while the latter is a personal attitude expressing preferences about how much and what kinds of interactions the person is willing to have with Negroes.

One obvious explanation of the kind of attitude with which I am concerned, one's public policy position on Negroes, is that it is derived from one's personal or social distance attitudes, or, similarly, that an underlying, more general out-group predisposition leads to similar public policy and personal attitudes toward blacks. What I shall now develop is an alternative explanation of public policy attitudes, one that suggests that negativism toward black equality is, in large part, a function of the individual's perceived social-political competence and his beliefs about the extent to which public attempts are being made to increase social-political competence among blacks. My purpose in exploring this line of explanation generally is to argue that the existence of inter-ethnic hostility and conflict should suggest to us not simply that there are, unfortunately, some hostile people in

the world but that the rules and norms through which a collectivity orients its interpersonal relations are important in determining the attitudes and feelings that accompany those relations. My purpose more specifically is to offer an explanation of what has been recently regarded as a "white backlash" in attitudes toward Negro equality that will reorient actions directed toward this phenomenon away from the manipulation of attitudes and toward manipulation of our social-political structure.

A Theoretical Commentary

Why is it that at the average cocktail party the second question that one is asked when becoming acquainted with a stranger is, "What do you do?" (The first is, "What was that name again?") A satisfactory answer, from the point of view of the questioner, would not be, "I go to cocktail parties." What is being requested is a job description and, as we well know, the questioner is not interested in starting an employment agency. The questioner is seeking cues in order to determine the status of his new conversation partner, so that he can orient his general demeanor toward condescension, deference, etc. This interpretation is not meant as an indictment of the "phoniness" of cocktail parties. That particular kind of encounter is simply brief and therefore more obvious than other, more slowly emerging social encounters in which cues can be obtained more indirectly. The fact of the matter is that people, Americans among others, are preoccupied with their status and the statuses of those around them. By status I mean "place with respect to the distribution of prestige within a social system,

and . . . by implication, with respect to the distribution of rights, obligations, power, and authority within the same system" (Gould and Kolb, 1964, p. 692).

This status preoccupation is not surprising. From the time at which a person first experiences collective living (usually in a family), he learns that things he does, e.g., demands attention, and things that he is, e.g., short and squat, determine his status in that collectivity; and one's status in a collectivity has a lot to do with the collectivity's reward and punishment schedule for him. The individual learns, moreover, that there is no escape. Upon entering school he finds that almost everything he must do in that collectivity has status implications. For example, if he is a "good" reader, he gets to sit in a privileged reading group, known perhaps as the Bluebirds, upon whom is bestowed at least much approbation from the teacher and, often, privileges that extend to other activities. "Bad" readers, on the other hand, are relegated to a group of pariahs known perhaps as the Moles. This, in itself, indicates that they are unworthy people, and their unworthiness frequently extends, as a result of their molish reputation, to other experiences in their classroom and at home.

By the time an individual reaches adult life, he has had a lot of help from others in deciding how "worthy" or "unworthy" he is along a variety of dimensions. Some for various personal and contextual reasons acquire almost nothing but "worthy" attributes and emerge as adults with highly efficacious feelings. Some, on the other hand can't even buy a "worthy" attribute (they have no currency) and emerge, as a rule, as adults with highly inefficacious feelings.

The rest occupy the middle range buoyed up in part by a knowledge that there are, at least, some "less worthy" than they and depressed by the knowledge that many are visibly" more worthy." The former first grader whose *raison d'etre* as a member of the Squirrel reading group had been, "I may not be a Bluebird but at least I am not a Mole," now uses the same formula but replaces Bluebird with King, President, professional, etc., and Mole with servant, pauper, thief, etc.

Whereas a person is understandably preoccupied with status questions, given the way in which status is institutionalized in the collective life, he need not detain himself in calculating his own status on a day-to-day basis. Barring dramatic events in which he may or may not be directly involved, his status will not change suddenly, except in his fantasies in which he saves a small child from the wheels of a truck with a headlong leap or is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize because someone finally listened to his aphorism on world peace. The relative day-to-day status continuity the individual enjoys allows him to deal with the expectations others have of him quite efficiently. Were he consciously to calculate the requirements for status maintenance on a given day, he might be overheard saying, "What is the minimum I must do today to avoid disgrace," or, for those with a more positive cast of mind, "How might I best assure those around me that I deserve to be what I am?" The calculus would, of course, be quite different for those who wish to raise or lower their status.

In a complex society where an individual engages in a relatively large number of interpersonal relations, his status continuity and that of those around him "cuts cognitive costs" in that he need not constantly re-calculate his status or worthiness in relation to the statuses of

others. His daily experiences are rarely recalcitrant to the status assumptions he makes, and part of the irritation he experiences when, for example, he sees an inter-racial couple or converses with a cab driver with an Oxford accent is due to the extra cognitive energy necessary to adjust to surprising sense data. It is more than irritating, however, when events conspire to make the individual's normal status calculations obsolete. When social change results in this kind of situation for a large group of individuals, whose status is shared, social movements or a variety of collective behavior incidents may arise. The motivation for action for an individual affected by situations bearing upon status calculations can be thought of in terms of both the costs associated with the calculus itself, i.e., cognitive costs, and the costs associated with the new status, i.e., status costs.

For some individuals the price of social change is too high (status-wise); i.e., they feel that their relative status is slipping or that their status calculus is ambiguous. When a considerable group of individuals is paying a high status price, we will probably find that they will manifest a strong and similar attitude toward some aspect of their social environment. In some instances a shared and strongly felt attitude will result in a social movement, the tendency, for example, when someone provides ideological leadership by suggesting a framework for translating the relevant attitudes into political action and by helping to demonstrate that the attitudes are legitimate by proclaiming them publicly. This latter aspect of ideological leadership provides the social support necessary to give persons with socially disapproved attitudes the courage to articulate them and, in some cases, to engage in relevant actions.

Relevance to the "Whitelash"

The theoretical commentary above is relevant to a broad range of social-political attitudes. Here the interest is in relating it to the recently-noted shift in white attitudes towards blacks referred to as the "white backlash" or "whitelash." In many cases the current negativisim toward black equality is expressed as negative opinions toward racial integration policies at national, state, and local levels. The emergence of George Wallace's American Independent Party may well be, in large part, the transformation of this attitude in to concrete form -- a political movement.

Present aggregate trends in white negativism toward black equality are compatible with both alternative explanations I have mentioned. It could be that the growing contact between white and black Americans is simply making negative social distance or personal policy attitudes toward blacks salient to the point where they spill over into negativism toward integration policy. There is no evidence of a white backlash in the sense that whites are reversing their formerly tolerant attitudes toward blacks. Still, while strong and growing support for the goals of black equality continues, support for the means employed in achieving the goal is significantly less. As the "Skolnick report" put it, "In sum, then, during the 1960's assertive attempts to achieve political, social, and economic equality of opportunity for Negroes have met with the disfavor of a majority of white Americans" (Skolnick, 1969, p. 187). Results from Gallup polls buttress this interpretation; they show that resistance to the pace of racial change is increasing (54% in 1968 said integration is being pushed too fast as opposed to only 30% in 1964 [Skolnick, 1969]).

For our explanation of the white backlash, let us assume that the attitudinal phenomenon at the aggregate level is a result not only of the spill-over of an increasing social-distance type of prejudice but also, or perhaps primarily, of a status-oriented calculus by many individuals. The aspect of the individual's status calculus that is particularly relevant to racial attitudes in the explanation is the individual's perceived relationship with the political system.

Imagine, for example, the political outlook of the average American who has learned to think of himself, as was suggested above, as relatively unworthy and incompetent. For many, the structure of our political institutions has the same message they received during their school experience. Many people never have any reason to feel politically competent. They view the political system as doing things to them, not for them. Indeed, the political system is, in certain respects, the reverse of the economic system. The economic system is deliberately seductive, while the political is cold and distant. It is easy, for example, to park a car if you wish to trade with local merchants. Parking, in fact, is frequently provided at public expense for such purposes. If for some reason a person wishes to see a state or local political official, it is usually impossible to park the car. If the person survives this hurdle, he is confronted by ceiling-high doors that psychologically diminish his stature and by cold receptionists whose role is to insulate public officials, e.g., "What is <u>your</u> problem." Contrast this experience with one with representatives of merchants (sales clerks), who are eager to help.

It is in this context that the explanation of the white backlash suggests itself. Consider the individual who feels socially and, more important, politically incompetent. He perceives that black Americans are becoming more and more politically competent, partly because some of them are willing to engage in extraordinary political activity and partly because they are receiving help from white leaders and non-leaders. This situation is particularly difficult to accept for those who have felt politically incompetent and have not seen a way to help themselves or to obtain help from others. They have begun to feel that the system is reaching out to help black Americans and is ignoring them. If this explanation is valid, the current negativism toward black equality can be viewed not simply as another form of race prejudice but as a form of sibling rivalry. The parents (the political system) are seen as helping the black child and ignoring the white. Let us now systematize this explanation in quasi-deductive form so that we can see what must be true if it, rather than simply racial prejudice, accounts for the observed aggregate trends in attitudes toward black equality.

The Sibling Rivalry Model: A Calculus

The explanation which we wish to consider is at the level of individual cognitions. At the outset, then, let us suggest the relevant cognitive components involved. The first component we shall call beliefs. A man's beliefs, in general, "compose his understanding of himself and his environment" (Bem, 1970, p. 5). "Evaluative beliefs" are beliefs that express preferences for given objects or states of affairs. When an evaluative belief functions as the last resort in a justificatory

argument, we call it a value, which Bem defines as "a primitive preference for or positive attitude toward certain end-states of existence" (Bem, 1970, p. 16). Finally, attitudes shall be regarded not, as they often are, as simply affective orientations toward objects, persons, and situations but rather as action-oriented, or normative, beliefs. To demonstrate the distinctions among these cognitive components, let us consider the following example of the cognitive support for an anti-fluoridation attitude.

value or evaluative belief	It is desirable that people have a choice in what they take to maintain health.
belief	Fluoridation of a city's water supply deprives people of free choice in what they take to maintain health.
attitude	A city's water supply should not be fluoridated.

Usually, the cognitive support for a particular attitude involves a number of beliefs and values. One formulation of the calculus for an attitude or action is congrument with the standard utility calculus from economics, which is expressed as follows:

$$E(U)_l = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i V_i$$

Where E(U) is the expected utility of choice number 1, n is the number of possible outcomes or values, V_i is the *i*th value affected by the choice, and P_i is the probability that choice number 1 will result in the *i*th value.

A number of theories of the cognitive foundations of attitudes have formulae that are essentially similar to the utility calculus above. Fishbein's attitude theory, for example, states that an attitude is

based upon beliefs about the relevance of certain objects or states of affairs and evaluations as to the relative importance of those objects or states of affairs. He expresses this theory algebraically as follows:

$$A_o = \sum_{i=1}^{n} B_i \, a_i$$

Where A_o is the attitude toward object O, B_i is the strength of belief i about O, a_i is the evaluative aspect of B_i or the evaluation of X_i, and n is the number of beliefs about O (Fishbein, 1967).

Before adapting this general theory of the structure of attitudes to the area of racial attitudes, let us process the calculus verbally with an example. Basically, the calculus provides a syntax or structure prescribing relationships among the components we are positing as providing the cognitive basis of attitudes. Imagine that the attitude object (A_o) presented to Mr. X is, once again, a proposal to fluoridate his city's water supply. The first information needed to construct his attitudinal calculus is the consequences or values (a_i) he perceives as affected by fluoridation. Let us assume that these are (1) an improvement in people's dental health (a_1), (2) an increase in local taxes ($-a_2$), and (3) a diminution of free choice in health planning ($-a_3$). Next, we have to know the extent to which he perceives each of these values affected by fluoridation. Each a_i must, according to the calculus, have a corresponding B_i. The individuals's calculus of his attitude toward fluoridation will then be as follows:

$$A_o = B_1a_1 - B_2a_2 - B_3a_3$$

The outcome of the calculus will depend on the size of the parameters for the B's and a's. If, for example the B's are to vary from 0.0 to 1.0,

each B that represents a strong belief about the effect of fluoridation on the corresponding value or consequence will have a value close to 1.0; while each B that represents a weak or negligible belief about the effect of fluoridation on its corresponding value will have a value close to 0.0. In like manner, the a's will have values or weights depending upon how important they are to the individual. They might, for example, be calculated on a five-point scale from extremely important through relatively unimportant.

If we work with the scales just suggested, the formula above might look this way:

$$A_o + 1.0 \times 2 - .5 \times 2 - 1.0 \times 5 = -4$$

In this example, the individual feels certain ($B_1 = 1.0$) that fluoridation will improve dental health, a feeling that has a positive value of 2, i.e., it is a relatively unimportant consequence. He feels that there may or may not be an increase in local taxes as a result of fluoridating the city's water supply ($B_2 = .5$), and, again, this is a relatively unimportant consequence ($a_2 = -2$). Finally, he feels certain ($B_3 = 1.0$) that fluoridation will have an effect on a very important value, free choice in health planning ($a_3 = 5$). As is indicated in the calculus above, the impact of this last value on free choice in health planning is sufficient to create a negative attitude toward fluoridation.

We can now bring together the theoretical commentary on status preoccupation with the calculus for the cognitive basis of attitudes to construct an explanation of negativism toward black equality. The attitudinal calculus I shall posit to explain white attitudes toward

integration policy has a structure that is similar to the calculus just described. The value involved is, of course, status, which will be designated V_s. The importance of this value in the attitudinal calculus can be conceived of as the degree of status concern, defined as "the value placed on symbols of status and the attainment of higher status" (Kaufman, 1957). To measure status concern we can take the responses to questions from a status-concern scale utilized by Kaufman. Two of these items, for purposes of illustration, are (1) "The raising of one's social position is one of the most important goals in life," and (2) "One of the things you should consider in choosing your friends is whether they can help you make your way in the world."[1] Responses to these questions range from strongly agree through strongly disagree on a five-point scale.

The belief component of the calculus involves beliefs about the individuals's political competence relative to his perception of the political competence of Negroes in his community. The belief about his own political competence as PC_w. Two items were constructed to provide a measure of the perceived distance between the respondent's political competence and Negroes' political competence. The first item asked, "Suppose a regulation were being considered by the Oakland City Government that you thought very unjust or harmful. How likely is it that you and others like you could influence the decision?" The second item asked, "What about the Negroes in Oakland; how likely is it that they could

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[1]These items were actually utilized in an empirical study, now in progress, of white racial attitudes and the Wallace vote. Items used for subsequent illustrations will also be taken from the interview schedule used in the study. The respondents were randomly selected from the registered white voters in Oakland, California.

influence the decision?" Responses to both items were recorded on a five-point scale ranging from very likely through very unlikely. By subtracting responses to the second item from responses to the first, we obtain a scale that is positive when the individual perceives himself as having more political competence than blacks, neutral, or 0, when he has the same perceived political competence, and negative when he has less perceived political competence than blacks'.

Now that we have identified the substantive referent of the cognitive components for a model of racial attitudes, we can put them together. The structure of our explanation of white attitudes toward black equality is as follows:

$$A_r = V_s (PC_w - PC_b)$$

Where A_r is the racial attitude in question, V_s is the value the individual places upon status, PC_w is his rating of his political competence, and PC_b is his rating of blacks political competence. To process this formula verbally, it says that an individual's attitude toward black equality is a function of his belief about the distance between his and black' political competence, weighted by the extent to which he values status.

Although this theory of racial attitudes is derived from the more general theory, illustrated above, of the cognitive basis of attitudes, as stated in the formula, however, it is still in the form of theorems or universal statements without empirical referents. The measurement criteria we suggested for each of the components of the theory (responses to an interview) serve as "coordinating definitions" of theoretical terms that relate them to observations. We have not, as yet, suggested measurement criteria for our major concept, attitudes toward integration policy.

It is particularly important that we establish that attitudes toward integration policy and social distance attitudes toward blacks do not overlap completely. If they do, we could not set up an experimental design for testing the extent to which our "sibling rivalry model" provides an independent explanation of anti-integration attitudes. Fortunately, research into the dimensions of racial attitudes has shown that attitudes toward integration-segregation policies are a content dimension distinct (highly correlated cluster of items) from other racial attitudes such as the acceptance or rejection of close personal relationships (Woodmansee and Cook, 1967). So it is with the data set collected in Oakland (see footnote 1, p. 17). Thus, we can measure attitudes toward integration with a single score representing an individual's contribution to a cluster of integration attitudes that includes items on school, housing, job, and political party integration. In like manner, we can create a control variable on social distance attitudes from scores on a cluster of items that includes such social distance criteria as toleration of black neighbors, black dinner partners, and black marriage partners.[2]

Having specified the appropriate measurement criteria, we can now examine the hypotheses or empirical predictions that can be derived from our explanation. The alternative explanations are, once again, (1) that attitudes toward black equality are explained by social distance attitudes (an explanation already impeached by the

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[2]A factor analysis of the Oakland data utilizing an oblique rotation resulted in separate but slightly correlated dimensions which could be unambiguously labelled integration-segregation and social distance dimensions containing the kinds of items detailed above. Factor scores of each individual on these dimensions would provide measurement criteria for the two kinds of racial attitudes.

cluster analysis discussed above) and (2) that attitudes toward black equality are explained by the "sibling rivalry model." We already know, by virtue of the low-to-moderate correlation between the two kinds of attitude clusters, that social-distance attitudes have some spill-over effect on integration-segregation attitudes. If the sibling rivalry explanation is valid, it will have to have a marked independent effect upon attitudes toward black equality. If, then, explanation #1 can be rendered as $A_r = A_{sd}$ (where A_{sd} is the notation for social distance attitudes) and explanation #2 is $A_r = V_s (PC_w - PC_b)$, the tables should be set up as follows:

Social Distance (A_{sd})

Hi
$PC_w - PC_b$

V_s	-	0 or +
h	a_1	b_1
l	c_1	d_1

Med
$PC_w - PC_b$

V_s	-	0 or +
h	a_2	b_2
l	c_2	d_2

Low
$PC_w - PC_b$

V_s	-	0 or +
h	a_3	b_3
l	c_3	d_3

For ease in interpretation I have selected two parameters for each variable in the sibling rivalry formula and three for the control variable (A_{sd}). Thus, status concern (V_s) is scored as high and low, and social distance attitudes (A_{sd}) are scored as high, medium, and low. Beliefs about the relative political competence of blacks are scored as negative or zero or positive (where negative means that blacks are perceived as more politically competent than the respondent and zero or positive means that the respondent sees himself as having the same as or greater political competence than blacks). Finally, each cell

contains the average score on the integration, or black equality, attitude scale for all individuals in that cell.

Now, let us assume that individuals with higher scores are more negative toward black equality than individuals with lower scores. Ignoring the social distance variable (A_{sd}) and thus the subscripts on the cell letters, for the moment, our predictions for the cells within each table are as follows:

$$a > b, c, \text{ and } d$$
$$b \text{ and } c > d$$

These are the empirical hypotheses, which are derived from the sibling rivalry or status calculus explanation. Cell "a" should have the largest average anti-integration score, because it is the cell for individuals with both a concern for high status and a perception that they are less politically competent than blacks. Cells "b" and "c" should be larger than cell "d" because in "b" and "c" at least one predictor of anti-integration attitudes is present (high status concern or negative political competence) and, in "d", neither is present.

If the pattern of cell predictions is maintained for each level of social distance attitudes (in each table), we would have demonstrated that the status calculus or sibling rivalry model provides an independent explanation of anti-integration attitudes. The pattern of predictions necessary for establishing the plausibility of the prejudice or spill-over explanation is as follows:

$$a_1 > a_2 > a_3$$
$$b_1 > b_2 > b_3$$
$$c_1 > c_2 > c_3$$
$$d_1 > d_2 > d_3$$

These empirical predictions suggest that, if social distance attitudes have an independent effect on integration attitudes, when we hold constant the effect of status concern and political competence preceptions, each level of social distance attitudes should result in a different level of integration attitudes.

If we found that both sets of predictions followed the required patterns, our interpretation would be that the status calculus and social distance attitudes provide complementary explanations of integration attitudes (with one or the other being more salient, depending upon the relative strength and consistency of one versus the other pattern of predictions). If only one pattern of predictions results, we would conclude that the explanation from which it is derived is more plausible than the competing explanation.

Conclusions

The theory construction enterprise undertaken above is more than simply an exercise to demonstrate how one can deal with competing or complementary explanations of the same phenomenon. As we noted, the explanations one chooses to examine involve more than casual decisions. The choice of an explanation of ethnic attitudes, for example, carries with it commitments to various forms of collective living and to conceptions of what aspects of the collective life should be regarded as problematic and what range of solutions should be considered in dealing with what are identified as problems.

What is suggested, for example, when an individual is apprehended committing what society regards as a crime? From one frame of reference,

the act suggests simply that something should be done to prevent that person from violating public expectations again. From another frame of reference, however, the act might suggest that the public's expectations for the individual are unreasonable. In like manner, a frame of reference or set of value premises guided the choice of a status-oriented explanation of negativism toward Negro equality. If the explanation be valid, it will lend support to recommendations that we should cope with inter-ethnic hostility not by dealing with attitudes but by dealing with the situations out of which they arise. In this instance, the situation is one in which the average individual is confronted by institutionalized status expectations that are almost certain to create a negative self-image and a low sense of social and political competence.

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